

Approved For Release 2008/11/07 : CIA-RDP86M00886R001200330002-4

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

OLL 84-4621/1

21 DEC 1984

The Honorable Ted Weiss
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Weiss:

The letter you sent to the President in early November expressing concerns over Edgar Chamorro's unfounded allegations that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) advised FDN officials to misinform Members of Congress was forwarded to me for a response. We have looked into Chamorro's allegations and can find no record or recollection to support these charges, and our officers deny ever having counselled or directed FDN officials in their approach to any Member of Congress.

As you undoubtedly already know, the staff of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence thoroughly investigated the entire psychological operations manual affair, which included the allegations made by Mr. Chamorro, concerning CIA involvement in the lobbying of Congress.

Should you need additional information on this subject, I respectfully refer you to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Sincerely,

/s/ William J. Casey

William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence

Distribution:

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

29 November 1984

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
Center for National Security Studies
122 Maryland Ave. N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Thank you for your letter of 13 November 1984 to Director
Casey.

Sincerely,



George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs

Distribution:

- Original - addressee
- 1 - ER #84-9914/2
- 1 - PAO Registry #84-0442
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
Approved in draft by D/OLL (Mr. Briggs)



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| <p>Remarks</p> <p>For appropriate action and direct response if necessary.</p> <p>(Per Mr. Lauder, 23 Nov 84, no response will be made)</p> |
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 Executive Secretary
 27 Nov 84
 Date

Center for National Security Studies

November 13, 1984

Executive Registry

84- 9914/1

Mr. William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Casey:

We write to express our concern about recent allegations made by Mr. Edgar Chamorro of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) and published in The New York Times of November 1, 1984. According to Mr. Chamorro, the Central Intelligence Agency has instructed officials of the FDN to misrepresent FDN policy in statements to the press in order to influence the Congress of the United States; has paid FDN officials to travel to Washington in order to lobby Members of Congress and instructed the FDN officials what to say and what not to say to Members; and has even provided FDN officials with what appear to be rudimentary psychological profiles of some Members of Congress.

We believe that such actions by the CIA violate the law. We therefore request that the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency conduct an investigation to determine:

- 1) whether Mr. Chamorro's allegations are true; and if so
- 2) the further extent, if any, of improper efforts by the CIA to influence the domestic political process;
- 3) the extent and purposes of psychological profiling and other collection of intelligence information by the CIA concerning Members of Congress;
- 4) whether the activities investigated involved violations of law or executive order; and
- 5) what corrective action has been taken or is planned in connection with any such illegal or improper activities.

We also request that the Agency issue a public report concerning the results of its investigation.

As you know, Executive Order 12333 on United States

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Intelligence Activities prohibits the conduct of special activities that are "intended to influence United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media." The covert operation described by the Times has precisely that purpose.

The operation was also clearly a "significant anticipated intelligence activity." Since it is hard to imagine that the Agency told the House and Senate intelligence committees that the U.S. Congress was the target of a planned domestic covert operation, we believe that the CIA may have violated section 501(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, which requires the Director of Central Intelligence to inform the Committees in advance of any significant intelligence activity. The CIA may also have violated section 501(a)(3) of that Act, which requires the Agency to inform the Committees in a timely fashion of any illegal intelligence activity.

Finally, officials of the CIA who provided assistance to lobbying efforts by the FDN or other Nicaraguan insurgent groups may have violated the Foreign Agents Registration Act, which requires persons acting within the United States in the interests of a foreign principal to register with the Attorney General.

We consider the covert operation described by The New York Times a serious affront to the democratic process of the United States. We urge you to investigate the matter and to ensure that any illegal or improper activities are immediately brought to an end and that in the future the CIA adheres to the law.

Sincerely,

Morton H. Halperin (112)

Morton H. Halperin

enclosure: article from The New York Times of November 1, 1984

cc: John Stein, Inspector General

A Rebel Says C.I.A. Pledged Help in War Against Sandinistas

By JOEL BRINKLEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 31 — A senior director of the largest Nicaraguan rebel force says the Central Intelligence Agency recruited him to serve as a director two years ago and told him, "We are going to help you change the Government in Managua and do it within a year."

The officer, speaking in an interview, asserted that the C.I.A. paid his family's expenses for more than a year and coached him and other rebel leaders on what to say in public so they would not anger members of Congress, who had to approve financing for the contras, as they are called.

In interviews at his home in Key Biscayne, Fla., Edgar Chamorro, one of the seven directors of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, gave a detailed description of the relationship between the the group and the C.I.A.

Mr. Chamorro said he was telling the story now, contrary to orders he and other rebel officers had received from the C.I.A., partly because he now believes that the United States is not likely to renew aid to the rebels. Aid was ended last spring.

Mr. Chamorro also said: "I resent some of the things the C.I.A. did. The

Continued From Page A1

agency wasn't teaching our men democracy. They taught only a series of tricks."

The C.I.A. declined comment today on Mr. Chamorro's remarks.

Mr. Chamorro's account was confirmed in large measure by intelligence officials in Washington and by other officers of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, although some rebel officers disputed Mr. Chamorro's interpretation of some events.

One of those officers, Alfonso Callejas, another of the group's directors, has acknowledged, however, that Mr. Chamorro "is an honest man" who "tells the truth."

Mr. Chamorro was in charge of publishing a C.I.A. manual that offered advice on guerrilla insurgency and political assassination.

A C.I.A. employee identified as John Kirkpatrick prepared the manual from an old United States Army psychological warfare primer, and Mr. Chamorro said he was angry when he read the manual's final version last December.

Mr. Chamorro said he wrote a letter to the C.I.A.'s station chief in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, last December, complaining about the manual and about

Mr. Kirkpatrick. A few days later, Mr. Chamorro said, he and other officers met with the station chief at his Tegucigalpa home, where Mr. Chamorro heatedly complained that Mr. Kirkpatrick "bypassed me."

C.I.A. Man 'Defensive'

Mr. Chamorro said he told the station chief that Mr. Kirkpatrick "wrote these terrible things into the book that were wrong." In response, the station chief "was very defensive of his men," Mr. Chamorro said.

Another C.I.A. official, in Miami, first approached Mr. Chamorro about serving as an officer in the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, in the fall of 1982, he said. He had been working for the rebel cause, but not in an official capacity.

The official, purportedly the head of the C.I.A.'s large Miami office, asked Mr. Chamorro if he would be willing to meet with a man from Washington, and a few days later "a man from the Government who said he was speaking for the President told me I could help the cause," he said.

The man "said they needed people who they could sell to Congress," which at that time was debating legislation to end United States aid to the rebels. "He said we needed to move quickly," Mr. Chamorro said.

C.I.A. Supports Family

At that time, the rebel group's directorate had a bad reputation in Washington and Nicaragua because of past links between some of its members and Nicaragua's former dictator, Anastasio Somoza Debayle.

Mr. Chamorro, a member of a prominent Nicaraguan family who was educated at Harvard and other American universities, said, "They were trying to repackage the F.D.N. for Congress," he said, using the group's Spanish initials, "and I was not a Somocista."

Mr. Chamorro agreed to serve and said the agency paid support for members of his family, who lived in Miami.

"They bargained with me; I was surprised," Mr. Chamorro said, but they agreed on a payment of about \$1,500 to \$2,000 a month. He said the agents advised him on how to declare the money for income taxes, telling him, "I should say I was a self-employed consultant."

Mr. Chamorro said he believed the agency made similar arrangements with the other six directors. But Mr. Callejas, who said he still holds hope that the United States will resume aid to the rebels, said he received no payments for support of his family.

'Customs Agents' for U.S.

At first, Mr. Chamorro said, the agency men told him: "We are going to change the Government in Managua and do it within a year. They spoke with a lot of confidence and a clear commitment."

But within a few months, Mr. Chamorro and other rebel leaders said, the C.I.A. agents "changed their tune," starting to talk about interdicting arms to Salvador, not about the rebels' cause.

Mr. Chamorro said, "They wanted us to become customs agents for the United States, or mercenaries."

In December 1982, Congress approved an amendment forbidding the C.I.A. to provide military aid "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua." Instead, the Administration explained, the rebels were being paid to help interdict arms being smuggled from Nicaragua to Salvadoran insurgents.

All the F.D.N. officers interviewed said the group's goal never changed; it was to overthrow the Sandinista Government. Mr. Chamorro, who was the group's official spokesman, said: "When I'd say that in an interview, I'd immediately get called by the station chief. He'd send his assistant over who would tell me, 'That's not the language we want you to use.'"

Visits to Capital Recounted

Agency personnel frequently arranged for rebel officers to fly to Washington, where they would visit members of Congress "to lobby," Mr. Chamorro said. "They would tell us which senators and congressmen to see and what to say," and the C.I.A. officers would brief the rebels when members of Congress came to Honduras on fact-finding trips.

Mr. Chamorro, who frequently consulted old appointment books to refresh his memory as he talked last week, pointed to one page where he had noted a C.I.A. agent's briefing on Representative Geraldine Ferraro, who was planning a trip to Honduras last spring.

The notation said: "Very, very liberal" and "impressionable on religious issues."

Mr. Chamorro said the C.I.A. tried to direct the rebel group's military actions by controlling the supply of arms. About once a month, agency couriers brought cash to the group's office in Honduras, to pay for food for the soldiers. But the agency bought all the arms itself, several officers said.

For food, the agency paid about \$1

per soldier a day, in Nicaraguan, Honduran and United States currency. The money was delivered in boxes or suitcases, Mr. Chamorro said, and rebel officers had to sign receipts.

No Discretionary Funds

All the while, Mr. Chamorro and other officers said, the C.I.A. agents told them not to say they were being supplied by the C.I.A. "They told us to say the people giving us aid asked to remain anonymous," Mr. Chamorro said.

"We did not get any discretionary funds," Mr. Chamorro said, and sometimes the agency would not give the rebels the arms they wanted. Several officers said they repeatedly asked for explosives so they could blow up bridges and other targets, but most often the C.I.A. said no.

"They thought we would blow up all the bridges from the border to Managua," Mr. Chamorro said, "and Congress wouldn't like that."

So "we bought the explosives ourselves, in Guatemala," he said.

The rebels kept asking for an air-

plane so they could supply their troops inside Nicaragua, but "they took almost a year to get us one, and it was so old and that we called it the rusty pelican," Mr. Chamorro said.

The plane was a World War II vintage Douglas DC-3, and one rebel officer, on a visit to Washington, ruefully noted that a DC-3 hung from the ceiling

in the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum.

By mid-1983, Mr. Chamorro and other officers said, they began debating the C.I.A.'s role in their struggle.

"They were paying us to fight, but they weren't letting us win," Mr. Chamorro said. "Many Nicaraguans were being killed for the goals of a larger East-West confrontation that had nothing to do with us."

But Mr. Callejas, while acknowledging that "there was disagreement about our goals," said: "We had nothing to complain about. We knew from the beginning what the U.S. Congress approved the funds for."

When some rebel leaders complained to the C.I.A. agents, Mr. Chamorro said, "they'd say things like: 'That's a very good point' or 'interesting idea.'"

"They were always evasive," he said.

Last fall, the rebel officers said, the C.I.A. increased its staff in Honduras to 25 or 30 people, including secretaries and support personnel. They had their own headquarters in a Tegucigalpa house.

At about the same time, Mr. Kirkpatrick arrived, and after spending a few days observing the rebels' psychological warfare training program, he flew to Washington, where he spent about 10 days, Mr. Chamorro said. When Mr. Kirkpatrick returned, he began work on the manual.

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
Executive Secretary

Date

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Remarks: Please prepare response for DCI Signature.



Executive Secretary

14 Nov 84

Date

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DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN
NEW YORK

Executive Registry

84- 9914

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 9, 1984

Dear Mr. Director:

On November 1, Joel Brinkley of the New York Times reported an interview with Edgar Chamorro of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Mr. Chamorro said it was a routine for CIA officers to arrange visits between FDN officers and members of Congress and for the FDN officers to be briefed on characteristics of those members and what to say to them.

Mr. Chamorro noted, for instance, that he was told by a CIA agent that Representative Geraldine Ferraro was "very, very liberal" and "impressionable on religious issues." The full passage is as follows:

Visits to Capital Recounted

Agency personnel frequently arranged for rebel officers to fly to Washington, where they would visit members of Congress "to lobby," Mr. Chamorro said. "They would tell us which senators and congressmen to see and what to say," and the CIA officers would brief the rebels when members of Congress came to Honduras on fact-finding trips.

Mr. Chamorro, who frequently consulted old appointment books to refresh his memory as he talked last week, pointed to one page where he had noted a CIA agent's briefing on Representative Geraldine Ferraro, who was planning a trip to Honduras last spring.

The notation said: "Very, very liberal" and "impressionable on religious issues."

If substantially accurate, these charges reflect an invasion of the privacy of members of Congress and improper conduct about which the intelligence oversight committees of the Congress have to inquire.

Are the charges substantially accurate? Were officers of the FDN directed to meet with members of Congress and coached beforehand? If so, please furnish a list of the members of Congress targeted for such meetings and the characterizations made about these members.

Sincerely,

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

Honorable William J. Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505



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